Byte-exact cereal binary layout, RFC 8439 ChaCha20-Poly1305, RFC 7914 scrypt defaults; tokio transport preserving the original's observable behavior (contract B1-B3, B5 quirks included). Parity evidence: golden C++ vectors in tests/vectors.rs and loopback behavior tests; both cross-directions verified against the unmodified C++ binaries. Source: https://git.0xfeedc0de.com/michael/OmniVox
4.8 KiB
OmniVox Port — Parity Contract
Source: omnivox/ (C++17/20, asio + cereal + CryptoPP + fmt)
Target: omnivox-rs/ (Rust, tokio + RustCrypto)
End state: A — replacement. Rust crate + example binaries ship; C++ deleted at cut-over.
Seam: the TCP network boundary. C++ and Rust must interoperate byte-for-byte at any mix.
Unit of parity
The byte stream on the wire at the TCP boundary, and the callbacks the library delivers to the application (connect / data / disconnect with their context).
Wire format (recovered — this is normative)
All integers little-endian (x86 native memcpy/cereal, never htonl'd anywhere).
- Framing:
u32payload-length prefix, then that many bytes. Read in two async steps (header, then body) with separate timeouts. AeadPacket(cereal binary archive = raw fields, no magic/header):nonce[12] || tag[16] || u64 len || ciphertext[len]DatagramPayload:u16 id || u64 qword || u64 len || bytes[len]- AEAD: ChaCha20-Poly1305 per RFC 8439 (CryptoPP impl is RFC-conformant).
No AAD. Random 12-byte nonce per message (
AutoSeededRandomPool). - Key: scrypt per RFC 7914,
N=2^17, r=8, p=1, dkLen=32, passphrase = raw password bytes, salt = raw salt bytes. Both peers must set the identical key.
Not acceptable (any difference = regression)
- Any wire byte: framing, field layout, key derivation, AEAD construction.
- Tamper behavior:
DecryptAndVerifyfailure → message dropped, error logged, connection stays open (exception caught in processMessage). - Limits:
MAX_MESSAGE_SIZE = 5 MiB; header0or> 5 MiB→ log + disconnect. - Timeouts: per-message header-wait =
timeoutMs(server, per client arg); body stall = 5000 ms fixed. Server per-client stall timers; client side has no timers (ctx.id == serverContext.id path). - Client IDs: server assigns from 1, monotonic (
nextClientId), visible inConnectionContext.id. - Callback order on accept: allow → client registered & reading before the connect log; deny → socket closed, disconnect callback fires.
sendToServerreturns false unless socket open and status Connected;sendToClientreturns false if id unknown.- Malformed/undecryptable message: logged, skipped, connection survives.
Acceptable (do not chase)
- Log text, wording, timestamps; steady-clock
creationTimevalues. - Thread structure (pool + io_context → tokio tasks); task scheduling.
- Message processing order: C++ server processes on a worker pool and can reorder concurrent messages; Rust may differ in interleaving. Per-connection stream order must still be preserved.
- Exact race outcomes under B1/B3 below (timing-dependent in C++ itself).
- TCP_NODELAY: C++ leaves Nagle ON (
NODELAY_OPTnever defined); Rust matches default. Never observable in payload bytes.
Bug/quirk inventory — preserved, NOT fixed (fixes = separate commits after parity)
| # | Source | Behaviour | Port decision |
|---|---|---|---|
| B1 | OmniVox.h:914 | Bad header size logs + handleDisconnect without returning — proceeds to read a body of that size (0-byte read succeeds and processes an empty packet → decrypt error logged) |
Preserve: disconnect + best-effort body read; races allowed |
| B2 | OmniVox.h:990 | Decrypt/parse errors are swallowed (log only), connection kept | Preserve |
| B3 | OmniVox.h:630 | sendToClient does a blocking asio::write while holding the clients lock |
Rust holds the connection write lock across the full write; log as follow-up improvement |
| B4 | OmniVox.h:960 | Processing on thread pool → concurrent reordering | Acceptable-difference above |
| B5 | OmniVox.h:869 | Client mode never arms stall timers | Preserve |
| B6 | OmniVox.h:782 | timeoutCheckerThread/timeoutCheckerRunning — dead code, never started |
Not ported (dead) |
| B7 | OmniVox.h:99 | inline std::optional<WorkGuard> global — shadowed by member, dead |
Not ported (dead) |
| B8 | client.cpp:101 | Client sleeps 15 s then stops; server sleeps UINT32_MAX hours |
Examples mirror this |
Deliberately not ported
B6/B7 dead code; the cereal/cryptopp/asio vendored trees; PackedValue64 union
(only .qword is ever serialized → port as u64 field on DatagramPayload);
ThreadPool_ as a class (tokio replaces it; do not transliterate).
Verification (how parity is proven)
- Vector tests: golden
scrypt+ cereal-layout + AEAD vectors generated by C++ (cppgenhelper inomnivox-ref/) checked intotests/vectors/. - Differential cross-tests over loopback: C++ server ↔ Rust client, Rust server ↔ C++ client — echo handshake must round-trip.
- Tamper test: flip a ciphertext byte mid-stream → receiver logs and survives.
- Differential harness reports inputs-compared and differences-found.
cargo test --all-features && cargo clippy --all-targets --all-features && cargo fmt --check