michael
c614d8345f
Red-team review of the (byte-exact) v1 port found replay, cross-session frame portability, pre-auth allocation amplification, and a symmetric key that let either peer forge as itself — flaws inherent to the v1 wire format. v2 closes them: - fixed 69-byte OVX2 hello; server validates before replying; v1 and wrong-version peers see an immediate close - HKDF(ephemeral X25519 DH, PSK, transcript) -> direction-separated session keys; forward secrecy per connection - strictly increasing u64 sequence nonces: any replay or reorder drops the connection (regression tests in tests/protocol_v2.rs) - Config: message-size cap (64 KiB default), connection semaphore, idle/body-stall/handshake/send timeouts on both roles (client-side timers retire the old no-client-timeouts quirk) - message processing inline per connection; user callbacks panic- isolated; poison-tolerant mutexes; demo key refused in release builds - PROTOCOL-V2.md supersedes PARITY-CONTRACT.md (retired, kept as port history); Cereal payload encoding is unchanged Payload serialization remains byte-exact with the original C++ (the golden scrypt/cereal vectors still govern). Zero unsafe. Verified live: server<->client handshake, encrypted echo, clean teardown. Cuts over from the C++ implementation, which is deleted (phase 5 of the port contract); it remains in the original gitea repository.
2.5 KiB
2.5 KiB
omnivox-rs
Encrypted async TCP client-server messaging — protocol v2. A Rust library plus example binaries, descended from the OmniVox C++ library and hardened past it after a full red-team review of v1.
- X25519 handshake on every connection → forward secrecy, session-bound keys
- ChaCha20-Poly1305 with strictly increasing sequence numbers → replay-proof
- Direction-separated traffic keys, fixed-size pre-auth surface
- scrypt (RFC 7914) password-based key derivation;
Cerealpayload encoding (byte-exact with the original's cereal binary format) for data portability - tokio transport: connection caps, idle/stall/send timeouts, panic-isolated
callbacks; zero
unsafe
Not wire-compatible with the C++ original or v1 — by design; v1 peers
are refused at the handshake. See PROTOCOL-V2.md for the full normative
spec and PARITY-CONTRACT.md (retired) for the port's history.
Usage
use omnivox::{Config, Cereal, CodecError, Decision, OmniVox, derive_encrypt_key};
use std::sync::Arc;
let endpoint = OmniVox::<MyPayload>::new();
endpoint.set_encrypt_key(derive_encrypt_key(b"password", b"salt", 17, 8, 1)?);
endpoint.start_server(8080, Config::default(), on_data, on_disconnect, on_connect).await?;
Payload types implement Cereal (raw little-endian fields, u64 vector
lengths — the original's serialization). Runnable demos: examples/.
Security posture
| v1 weakness | v2 answer |
|---|---|
| captured frames replay forever | strict sequence numbers; a replay kills the connection |
| frames portable across connections | keys bound to per-session nonces |
| 5 MiB pre-auth allocation from 8 bytes | fixed 69-byte handshake before any attacker-sized read |
| one symmetric key, either peer can forge as itself | direction-separated HKDF session keys |
| static key, no forward secrecy | ephemeral X25519 per connection |
| no client-side timeouts | full idle/stall discipline both roles |
| panicking user callback killed the read loop | callbacks panic-isolated |
| demo password in every repo checkout | release builds refuse the demo key |
Use random 32-byte PSKs where you can; an active attacker can grind scrypt against human passwords (PAKE planned).
Build & test
cargo test # includes attack regressions: replay, version, panic, timeouts
cargo clippy --all-targets -- -D warnings
cargo run --example omnivox-server # terminal 1
cargo run --example omnivox-client # terminal 2
License
GPL-3.0-or-later.